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The present article sets out to discuss religion as an important factor in 
the formation of social macrostructures, including their identity. In the last 
two centuries, the nature of its impact on Polish and Belarusian community 
has been very different. The text presents these differences against a broad 
sociohistorical background of Catholicism and Orthodoxy in both countries. 
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ІДЕНтИСНОСтІ ПОЛЯКІВ тА БІЛОРУСІВ
У статті аналізується релігія як вагомий чинник, що формує со-
ціальні макроструктури, в тому числі ідентичність. Протягом двох 
останніх століть її вплив на виникнення спільнот, які межують: 
польською та білоруською, дуже відрізнявся. Мета цієї статті – по-
казати ці відмінності з широким посиланням на історію: історичні 
обставини виникнення двох християнських віроспівідань: католициз-
му та православ’я.
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РЕЛИГИОЗНыЕ ОБУСЛОВЛЕННОСтИ 
ИДЕНтИчНОСтИ ПОЛЯКОВ И БЕЛОРУСОВ
Предметом нижеследующих рассуждений является религия как 
существенный фактор, формирующий социальные макроструктуры, 
в том числе идентичность. В течение последних двух столетий она 
явно по-разному влияла на образование соседствующих друг с другом 
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общностей: польской и белорусской. Цель настоящего текста – по-
казать эти разницы с обширными ссылками на историю: социальных 
обусловленностей возникновения обоих христианских вероисповеда-
ний: католицизма и православия.
Ключевые слова: религиозная идентичность поляков, религиозная 
идентичность белорусов, православие, католицизм. 
Religion, which at the lower level of society (individuals, small 
communities, parishes) functions as the core element building the ax­
iological orientation based on the idea of the sacred, is also often an 
important identity component of large­scale social groups and shapes 
national and civilisational distinctions. The present article sets out to 
discuss religion as an important factor in the formation of social mac­
rostructures, including their identity. In the last two centuries, the na­
ture of its impact on Polish and Belarusian community has been very 
different. The text presents these differences against a broad sociohis­
torical background of Catholicism and Orthodoxy in both countries. 
1. historical background 
Following the partitions of the Polish­Lithuanian Commonwealth 
between Russia, Prussia and Austria, throughout the 19th century and 
up to the First World War neither Belarusians nor Poles had their 
own state. Polish elites, in a bid to preserve their cultural identity, 
remoulded the political nation of the former Commonwealth (a supra­
ethnic category including the gentry, regardless of their language) 
into a cultural nation based on ethnicity, with the language as the 
central distinctive factor. As redefined, the Polish nation was con­
fined to a much smaller geographical area, but the total number of its 
members, now including also lower classes (particularly peasantry), 
expanded considerably. The process of formulating the new national 
ideology intensified after the fall of the January Rising (1863­1864). 
Forged mainly by intelligentsia descending from the nobility, the new 
concept of nation was based on the cultural heritage of the former 
Commonwealth and involved elements which clearly differentiated 
the Polish national character from that of the occupying powers, 
mainly Russians and Prussians. Apart from language and literature, it 
included also historical awareness (fostered by the awakeners of the 
period and relatively late to spread among the peasantry) and religion 
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(with the institutional role of the Catholic Church), as the Catholic 
faith distinguished Poles from Protestant Prussians and Orthodox 
Russians and united them across the partition borders. 
Aware of the fate of the Uniate Church in Belarusian and Ukrai­
nian territories, the Roman Catholic Church was anxious to ensure 
its own survival and supported the consolidation of the modern eth­
nolinguistic form of Polish national identity it could rely on. Thus, 
converging interests of the Polish society (mainly gentry, for the most 
part of the century) and the Church stimulated their cooperation to 
enable the survival of both of them. Society, especially the peasantry, 
which constituted the majority of the Polish population, was emo­
tionally committed to the Catholic cause as an important element of 
their own culture. This was also one of the reasons explaining a con­
siderable involvement of a large proportion of Catholic priests in the 
national movement. Such cooperation was motivated both by emo­
tional (cultural and national) concerns and by common interests. (A 
European analogy to the Polish situation was to be found in Ireland.) 
Consequently, Polishness became firmly connected with Catholi­
cism and with the Catholic Church as a powerful institution which 
was able to exert considerable political influence, while remaining 
distanced from the state structures. At the time of ordeal (national 
uprisings, defiance against Germanisation and Russification), Poles 
relied both on their religion as a cluster of distinctive values and on 
the Church as an institution defending their cultural identity, which 
sometimes involved playing a political role. Such a cultural and po­
litical function of the Church and, even more importantly, its civili­
sational role could also be observed at the time of communism.1 On 
a smaller scale, similar processes occurred in the 19th and early 20th 
century among Lithuanians, Slovaks, Ukrainians living in Galicia and 
Romanians from Transylvania. In all these cases, the Greek­Catholic 
or Roman Catholic clergy played an important role at various stag­
es of the nation­making process. Although strongly centralised, the 
Catholic Church often lent support to national separatism, as demon­
strated by tensions between the Lithuanian and Polish clergy within 
the church structures. The Church was also a major institutional com­
1 In the article, civilisation is understood in terms of a value structure, 
as in studies by Feliks Konieczny and Samuel Huntington, and not as the 
level of material development.
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ponent of the Western civilisation conducive to the nation­making 
process, which relied on such values as individualism, empowerment 
of individuals in relation to the state, respect for law, rationalism, 
social pluralism and activism. 
The above mechanism made Catholicism an important element 
of Polish collective self­identification and national identity. The fact 
that in terms of their religion ethnic Poles were a relatively homog­
enous community was instrumental in the process. However, the na­
tion­making potential of Catholicism is not to be identified with the 
intensity of religious experience or internalisation of religious values 
on the individual level. In fact, among the peasantry, who remained 
largely illiterate until the mid­20th century, religion was mostly per­
ceived as a ritual. To some extent, the Catholic Church functioned in 
lieu of the state institutions and such was also the case under commu­
nism. With the questionable legitimacy of Moscow­imposed authori­
ties and the Soviet system perceived as alien, the Church came to be 
regarded as a guarantee of political empowerment and civilisational 
identity of the Polish nation. 
Thus, while secularisation made its progress both in Western so­
cieties and in communist Central­Eastern Europe, the Church main­
tained, or perhaps even improved, its standing in Poland. Arguably, at 
the level of social macrostructures religion was ‘subordinated’ to the 
nation: Catholicism was ‘nationalised’, absorbed by the concept of na­
tion as a distinguishing feature, and became the religion of politicised 
symbols of the national community. In very simple terms, even though 
obviously not all Catholics were Poles, every Pole had to be a Catholic 
by definition. Consequently, the national status of communist athe­
ists was sometimes treated with suspicion and they were often seen as 
representatives of Moscow. On the other hand, individuals and par­
ish communities perceived religion in terms of the sacred, providing 
believers with an axiological perspective. Thus, religion was treated 
differently at the national level (a more secular approach) and at the 
lowest level (the sacred). Although each of them was characterised 
by different mechanisms, intensity and type of emotions, these lev­
els were not entirely independent: a national dimension of religion 
stimulated a personal attachment to parish communities and ensured 
the perpetuation of the vision of a Catholic Pole. In other words, what 
provided a more important link with the European culture on the level 
of emotional (subjective) reference was the nation (with Catholicism 
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as its component) rather than religion as perceived on the parish level 
(even though, objectively speaking, this was the medium of ‘Euro­
pean’ values providing civilisational identification of the Poles). 
The process of forming Belarusian identity and its religious con­
text was entirely different. Unlike ethnic Poles, Belarusians expe­
rienced large­scale religious conversions: they moved from Ortho­
doxy to form the Uniate Church and later returned to their former 
denomination while retaining a considerable Roman Catholic minor­
ity (there was also conversion of the elites to Protestantism during 
the Reformation). Following the Bolshevik revolution, Belarusians 
were subjected to decades of an effective programme of atheisation. 
Consequently, religion was not a stable or strongly perceived element 
of their cultural and social identity, as it was in the case of Poles. Or­
thodoxy, imposed as of 1839, distanced Belarusians from Poles and 
Lithuanians and brought them closer together with Russians and the 
majority of Ukrainians. Its Russian caesaropapist tradition involved 
domination of the state, which meant that the Orthodox Church was 
not in a position to stimulate separatist national movements within the 
Eastern Slavic Orthodox community. An instrument of implementing 
the national policy of the autocratic monarchy, it certainly lacked a 
nation­making potential in Belarus or Ukraine; even in Russia itself, 
it contributed to the level of national awareness mainly among the 
elites and not among the peasantry. 
In the Eastern Orthodox Slavic societies, the distance between the 
elites and peasantry (in terms of national awareness, empowerment, 
or the standard of living) was much more considerable than in the 
countries of Western Europe, and the nation­making process was far 
less advanced. What contributed to the low level of national aware­
ness was also the fact that the Orthodox Church had not destroyed the 
richness of pre­Christian folk culture, whereas its Catholic counter­
part had done so, thus paving the way for accepting ideological bonds, 
national ones among them. Belarusian peasants were still immersed 
in their folk tradition and did not feel as much need to accept modern 
ideologies describing the world as Catholics (and Protestants), who 
had largely lost it. Consequently, Belarusians were more susceptible 
to class ideology, as divisions of this kind had long been part of their 
own experience. 
This mechanism helps to explain the popularity of Bolshevik revo­
lutionary slogans in Orthodox societies. In 1920, the Red Army invad­
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ing Poland met with warm welcome only in Orthodox areas and Rus­
sian commanders were astonished to have encountered the opposite 
in Catholic regions, which mounted a popular resistance in defence of 
the newly reborn Polish state. In Polish society, just like in the rest of 
Europe, class ideology was generally much less popular than national­
ism. In the East Slavic areas, where the Bolshevik revolution prevailed, 
class ideology radically undermined the nation­making processes, de­
stroyed religion and constructed a different type of identity than the 
Western or Central European model. As indicated by the examples 
of Eastern Galicia (a Uniate region which until 1939 had never been 
controlled by Russia) or, to a certain extent, Volhynia (a part of Poland 
in the inter­war period), alternative processes were also possible. 
Interestingly, the 19th century Belarusian literature was written 
only by Catholics. They were also the main leaders of the early 20th 
century national movement, active particularly in the so­called Nasha 
Niva period (1906­1915). From 1906 to 1912 Nasha Niva, the main 
journal of Belarusian nationalists, was published both in the Belaru­
sian Latin alphabet (łacinka) and in the Cyrillic script (later only in 
Cyrillic); it had a much wider circulation among the Catholics. In his 
analysis based on the all­Russian census of 1897, Jerzy Turonek esti­
mates that on the territory approximate to the present­day Belarus the 
Orthodox population amounted to 70.36 %, while the figure for the 
Catholics was 13.46% (Jews: 14.00%) [1, p. 113].2 As propagated by 
Nasha Niva activists, Belarusian nationalist ideology largely resem­
bled, or even copied, patterns typical for models established by other 
Central Eastern nationalities with an ‘incomplete social structure’ [3, 
p. 20], and demonstrated distinctly different features from its Russian 
counterpart (which was, to an extent, only natural, given the fact that 
Russians had their own elites and state). 
As Belarusians were a religiously diverse community, religion 
was not included as a prominent element of the nation­making pro­
cess. An occidental vision of the nation pursued by the Catholics en­
tailed values which were somewhat foreign to, and only reluctantly 
accepted by, the Orthodox majority, and this is why it failed to gain 
a more substantial social support.3 Religious differences weakened 
2 М.Я. Гринблат [2, p. 252] estimates that at the end of the 19th century 
Belarusian population was 75% Orthodox and 25% Catholic.
3 This view is shared by Włodzimierz Pawluczuk, a well­known 
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the national process as they ‘ethnicised’ both communities at the 
non­national level: in a conflict situation, they reinforced the role 
of religion and created a civilisational divide. At the same time, the 
nation­making process operated among the elites and their Ortho­
dox members became (West) Russians, while the Catholics gener­
ally gravitated towards Polish identity. Orthodoxy was perceived as a 
Russian (or pan­Russian) religion and Catholicism was identified as 
a Polish faith. Exceptions to this rule were few and far between, and 
occurred only among the Catholics. Although Catholicism had cer­
tainly much greater nation­making potential (as corroborated by the 
developments in Lithuania or Galicia, a Uniate province), the Church 
in Belarus was in minority and felt strongly threatened by the state­
supported Orthodoxy. Consequently, it was not in a position to give a 
clear support to the Belarusian element, which was very weak at the 
time, as such a move would expose it to attacks from both the Russian 
and Polish opponents. The case of Lithuania was different since Rus­
sianness was not perceived as a threat to Polish or Lithuanian cultural 
(or national) identity. 
Since the elites had been Catholic for generations, social advance­
ment of Orthodox Belarusians almost invariably meant becoming the 
so­called ‘West Russian’, i.e. Russian (but not ‘Muscovite’) with a 
distinct element of Belarusian localism. They became members of a 
large community, a pan­Russian, Orthodox, East­Slavic civilisation 
including: Russians, the so­called ‘Little Russians’ (Ukrainians) and 
Belarusians. This entailed embracing most of the Russian cultural 
heritage, together with its clear sense of distance from the West (in 
the course of their cultural, national and imperial evolution of the 
previous centuries Russians defined themselves in opposition to the 
West) and its specific type of community (alien to the Western Euro­
pean tradition). Their religious identity (Orthodox) did not separate 
them from Russians. Quite on the contrary, given the fact that in the 
reality of the period the Orthodox Church functioned practically as 
an extension of the state structures, they were almost unreflexively 
immersed in Russianness. Thus in modern and contemporary history, 
Orthodoxy radically undermined separatist nation­making processes 
sociologist of Orthodox origin from the Białystok region: [4, p. 85­99; 5, p. 
60­66; 6, p. 31­50] and, to a certain extent, also by Jerzy Turonek, a Polish 
historian of Belarusian origin [7, p. 20­21].
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in the areas between the territories inhabited by ethnic Russians and 
ethnic Poles. As an instrument of Petersburg’s policies, it also ag­
gravated conflicts and created civilisational divides in the region. On 
the other hand, Christian denominations in the Latin Europe of the 
period did not produce such rifts or stir national conflicts. However, 
they were sometimes used instrumentally by national movements (es­
pecially in Central­Eastern Europe) with a view to consolidating their 
own power: religions were ‘nationalised’, and thus acquired a certain 
conflict potential. 
During the communist period, the Soviet government and the au­
thorities of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic made a consider­
able effort to successfully implement their anti­religious atheist poli­
cies. As a result, the level of religiousness fell dramatically, with the 
eastern regions more severely affected than the west of the country, 
which had been a part of Poland before the Second World War [8, p. 
178]. Viktor Odinochenko, a Belarusian scholar, observes that ‘under 
the Soviet rule, most Belarusians had neither an opportunity to take 
part in religious practices, nor access to any information on religion 
other than the official sources’ [9, p. 151]. Despite repressions against 
the Orthodox Church, historical studies pointed out that Belarusians 
were clearly a traditionally Orthodox society, thus closely connected 
with Russians, while Catholicism had been imposed from abroad. 
The Catholics were referred to as ‘potential agents of the Vatican’, 
whereas the Orthodox were presented only as ‘backward people’ [9, 
p. 157]. By the time of the fall of the Soviet Union, Belarusians in 
general, and the younger generation in particular, had become a large­
ly atheist, agnostic or religiously indifferent society. 
2. after communism 
Considering the reality and context of most European states, the 
fall of communism saw both the Catholic Church and the Polish na­
tional community in exceptionally good form. Owing to a number of 
factors, under communism ‘(…) in its social dimension, the Catholic 
Church had become the only platform of protest against the commu­
nist rule. At first expressed by the very fact of taking part in religious 
practices, in the course of time the protest made an increasing use of 
the Church structures for the purposes of anticommunist activity. The 
1980s saw the culmination of the role of the Church in the expression 
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of Polish national aspirations for freedom’ [10, p. 191­192]. How­
ever, Polish national identity certainly weakened in the course of the 
next two and a half decades, especially among the younger genera­
tion. If positive answers to a survey question ‘Are you proud to be 
a citizen of your country?’ are treated as an indicator of the level of 
national feelings, they fell from 66% to 50% between 1990 and 2008. 
Although the proportion is still above the European average, and it 
was among the top figures in 1990, its later rate of decline was second 
only to Latvia (17%) [10, p. 175­176]. While the reasons of this situ­
ation are quite complex, it is relatively easy to enumerate the main 
ones: the fall of communism, which meant that the system perceived 
as a vital threat to the Polish nation and its sovereignty was no longer 
in place; opening up to Europe and the world, as well as to the culture 
of mass consumption; and a sharp fall in the standard of education, 
resulting in lower historical awareness and literary knowledge among 
young people, thus, needless to say, affecting crucial elements of Pol­
ish national identity. The extermination of Polish elites during and 
immediately after the Second World War made a severe impact not 
only on the society under communism, but also on the political reality 
of the post­1989 Poland. Also, democracy naturally meant more divi­
sions in the society than had been the case in the old system. 
Strong national (sometimes chauvinist) sympathies on the right 
of the political spectrum are coupled with a­national (not to say anti­
national) feelings on the left (and especially the extreme leftist) wing. 
The authority of the Church, understood as a vital component of the 
national community, has decreased as a result of lowering levels of 
national identity. However, Irena Borowik, referring to the majority 
of Central­Eastern European states, observes that ‘(…) the role of 
traditional functions of religion has increased. One of the reasons is 
[often] that religion could return to its traditional place and can now 
be treated in terms of individual and collective freedom, a right that 
people exercise. Individual and collective religious practices have be­
come an important form of manifestation of identity. Religion also 
plays a particular role in legitimising politics’ [11, p. 33]. Thus, while 
some political parties and their followers refer to the Church and to 
Catholicism as important elements of their identity, others reject such 
a connection. Borowik also observes that ‘there is a certain correla­
tion between political preferences and religious attitudes. Higher reli­
giousness is linked with the right­wing sympathies (…), while lower 
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– with the left (…)’ [8, p. 138]. Discussing differentiation of reli­
giousness and religious activity, Borowik also points out the follow­
ing directions of the processes under consideration: (a) fundamental­
ist, (b) individualistic (more profound or selective), and (c) cultural 
(nominal or indifferent) [11, p. 28­29]. 
Mirosława Marody and Sławomir Mandes observe that ‘[r]eligion 
is an important element shaping the cluster of attitudes to national 
identity in society. As it turns out, in most countries with a high level 
of religiousness there is a connection between this factor and national 
identity. Although Denmark is an example of a country where a high 
level of nationalism is coupled with a low level of religiosity, the 
opposite correlation has not been observed at all. In most European 
countries we observe a low level of religiousness and nationalism’4 
[12, p. 184­185]. Poland has been going in this direction for over two 
decades. Although the Polish national community can be considered 
an ethno­cultural nation to a lesser extent than it used to in the inter­
war period or under communism, it still has not become a political 
nation. What stimulates this slow, but by no means inevitable, change 
is involvement of Polish citizens of other religion (Protestant or Or­
thodox), ethnicity (e.g. Belarusians in the Białystok region) or race 
(African descent) in public life, both political and cultural. 
Apart from connections between religion and national identity, 
there is a link between religion and socio­cultural identity in a broad 
sense. Another factor to be considered is religious identity as such, 
independent from other types of individual and collective identifica­
tion. Two surveys of European Values Study carried out in Poland in 
1990 and 2008 revealed that answers to two questions relating to the 
religiousness of Poles hardly changed at all: 94.2% of respondents pro­
fessed a religion and 96.1% declared they believed in God. However, 
in the period spanning eighteen years between the two surveys, the 
proportion of those who saw themselves as a religious person fell from 
90% to 83.5% and the change was most evident after 2005. Another 
trend involved falling frequency of religious practices, even though 
the proportion of those who did not go to church, did not have a church 
wedding, did not baptise their children or give their dead a religious 
burial did not rise considerably. ‘Thus, Poland is not a country where 
4 Following the Anglo­American tradition, as used here, the term ‘na­
tio nalism’ is descriptive and has no judgmental value attached.
38 Наукові записки Національного університету «Острозька академія». 
we could observe a social phenomenon of abandoning religion, and 
the number of atheists or agnostics is not rising sharply. What can be 
noticed, however, is a slow process whereby the level of identification 
with the Church as an institution is falling’ [12, p. 195­198, 203]. 
The surveys indicate that religion has clearly lost some signifi­
cance on the individual level and the proportion of respondents de­
claring themselves as religious fell. It can be said that religious feel­
ings among Poles are becoming lukewarm. However, at the same 
time there is an increased acceptance for public voice of the Church 
on political questions (such as election preferences, government deci­
sions), which means that society, at least to a certain extent, is depart­
ing from ideologically and politically conditioned attitudes formed 
by the communist authorities of the former period. In their analysis 
of the survey results, the authors try to find out what ‘maintains the 
attachment of the Polish society to Catholicism’, and ‘(…) why is 
it the case that in spite of the clearly visible impact of the processes 
of modernisation, religious identity is still the core element of their 
[Poles’] individual identity? The shortest possible answer to such a 
question would have to point at tradition and at a deficit of forms of 
identity that would be an alternative to religion and at the same time 
root individuals in social life. Although blurred by modernisation, 
religion still remains the only system which provides the Poles with 
a structure of their everyday reality, with a link to the past and with 
rituals that put actions performed by individuals in a social frame, 
thus making them meaningful’ [12, p. 200­204]. 
In Belarus, the fall of communism brought different consequences 
than in Poland. While in Poland the level of religious practices and 
identification with the Church declined, the Orthodox Church in Be­
larus not only began to follow its religious mission openly, but also 
returned to the tradition of Russian autocratic monarchy and became 
closely attached to the authorities and the state. Viktor Odinochenko 
observes that under the Soviet Union ‘Belarus identified itself with 
the Soviet reality much more readily than any other Soviet republic 
(…)’ [9, p. 150]. After independence, ‘numerous ideological stereo­
types changed in a very short period of time, which included also 
those relating to religion: formerly treated as «the opium of the peo­
ple», «a form of reactionary ideology», «a relic of the past», it now 
turned into «an inherent element of cultural tradition», «the founda­
tion of morality», etc.’ [9, p. 150­151].
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In 1990, a year before the fall of the Soviet Union, 20.7% of Be­
larusian population declared themselves as religious, while the figure 
for those indifferent and non­believers was 50.7%; the proportion of 
practitioners was very low (regular: 1.3%, irregular: 8%) [8, p. 192]. 
After independence (as indicated by answers to the question: ‘What is 
your religion?’), most Belarusians gradually began to identify them­
selves with Orthodoxy – 1993: 43.5%, 2002: 67.4%, 2010: 78.8% 
(the figures for Catholicism were: 8.4%, 13.1%, 11.1%, respectively) 
[13, p.16]. Whatever its depth, this increased religiousness can be at­
tributed to a number of factors. Firstly, just like in other former Soviet 
republics, it was conditioned by the approval from the new authorities 
of independent Belarus. In the new political reality, Marxist­Leninist 
ideology no longer performed its traditional functions and religion 
was to become a factor of stability integrating the social life of the 
new republic. After the election of Alexander Lukashenka as presi­
dent, the Orthodox Church received his favours and supported the 
state authorities in return. Secondly, Belarusian society saw religion 
as a cluster of values providing them with a system of reference in the 
post­Soviet ideological vacuum. At the individual level, it gave emo­
tional support offering a connection with the transcendental, which 
was very much appreciated when the entire communist world had 
fallen apart. At the community level, it not only built social structures 
(such as parish communities) and provided strong role models (the 
authority of the clergy increased sharply), but also offered a connec­
tion with the past by ensuring cultural continuity and a sense of be­
longing to tradition. Thirdly, religion also made it easier for people to 
survive the hardships of the economic slump and social insecurity. It 
was an element that made it possible, at least for some, to deal with 
the trauma of transformation. 
Declaring oneself as a believer does not always involve real reli­
giousness, but can only mean that the person has been baptised. Also, 
‘social consciousness has it that Orthodoxy is an inherent part of East 
Slavic cultural tradition, hence in most cases a personal declaration 
of being an Orthodox does not mean that the person is an Orthodox 
believer, or a Christian at all. Rather, it is a statement of East Slavic 
identity’ [9, p. 152]. Self­identification as a religious person is still a 
more frequent phenomenon in the west of the country than in the east­
ern regions, which were a part of the Soviet Union before the Second 
World War. At the same time, surveys conducted in western Belarus 
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reveal that Catholics are much more religious than Orthodox: they 
attend church services more often and are a more distinct religious 
community. In a 1994 survey, Catholic respondents declared a ‘spiri­
tual need’ as their main religious motivation (57%), while Orthodox 
ones said that ‘it is a thing done’ (44%). A considerable proportion 
of Catholics identify themselves as Poles and the overwhelming 
majority of Belarusians are Orthodox. In western Belarus, answers 
to the question ‘What is your religious denomination?’ were as fol­
lows: 87% of Belarusians, 80% of Russians and 91 % of Ukrainians 
stated they were Orthodox believers, while 94% of Poles declared 
themselves as Catholics (2.6% as Orthodox). ‘However, it is only the 
majority of Poles that consider themselves as religious or deeply reli­
gious (73%) and the corresponding figures for Belarusians, Russians 
and Ukrainians were 44%, 34% and 33%,5 respectively. Also, the lev­
el of regular religious practices declared by Poles is by far higher than 
in other national communities: 21% go to mass every Sunday and 
28% at least once a month. In the case of Belarusians and Russians, 
the corresponding figure for both categories is 10%. In the hierarchy 
of eleven values, Poles rank religion in the fourth place, while it is the 
bottom of the list for Belarusians and Russians, and last but one for 
Ukrainians. In all cases, «happy family life» came as number one’ [8, 
p. 195­196]. This situation probably stems from the minority position 
of both Catholicism and Poles in Belarusian society, as well as from 
the historical developments of the last two centuries. 
Surveys conducted in 1998 in the entire country showed that regu­
lar service attendance was declared by 19.6% of Orthodox, 44.7% of 
Catholics and 93.6% of Protestants (who are about a 1% minority in 
Belarus); the corresponding figures in 2007 were: 11.3%, 55.7% and 
96.8% [14, p. 229]. The 1999 European Values Study indicated that 
the overall average figure (all denominations) for service attendance 
at least once a week was 5.6% (in Poland: 58.9%) [15, p. 147]. Soci­
ologists and other experts in Belarusian studies often underline that, 
especially in the case of Orthodox believers, a large proportion of 
people declaring this affiliation treat it in terms of rejection of athe­
ism and identification with the East Slavic cultural tradition, or the 
5 I. Borowik notes that although the study sample of the Ukrainians 
(twenty two informants) reflected their proportion in the population, it was 
too small to make the results fully reliable.
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spirit of the times: it is a fashion, ‘a thing done’. Such members of a 
religious community have their children baptised, follow burial rites, 
sometimes attend church service twice a year, but at the same time 
their awareness of religious dogmas or knowledge of the Bible is of­
ten very low or almost non­existent. In addition to this, there is also 
religious eclecticism, belief in various types of magic practices and 
supernatural forces, or collecting symbolic religious artefacts [11, p. 
27­28; 8, p. 196; 9, p. 161]. 
To a certain extent, religion (particularly Orthodoxy) plays a dif­
ferent function than it does in Poland. Since it reinforces civilisa­
tional affiliation of Belarusians with the ‘Russian world’ (русский 
мир), common also to Russians and most Ukrainians, Orthodoxy is 
not really a factor of Belarusian nation­making process. In Moscow’s 
perspective, strong mutual relations within this community are some­
times treated as equivalent to national bonds. Andrzej Wierzbicki 
observes that ‘[t]he concept of «pan­Russian nation» (общерусская 
нация) as the backbone of the Russian national civilisation still re­
mains on the agenda of the Russian Orthodox Church, which has 
been safeguarding the idea of the «Holy Rus» [Свята́я Русь], now 
in the form of the «Russian world» (русский мир), throughout the 
entire Russian history. The «pan­Russian nation» invariably consists 
of «ethnic Russians» (этнические русские), that is Russians, Belaru­
sians and Ukrainians. The conviction of «pan­Russian» unity is based 
on a belief in the common origin of Eastern Slavs, which gives it a 
primordial character with elements of constructivism. However, it is 
the spiritual and religious community rather than common origin that 
is emphasised by the Russian Orthodox Church’ [16, p. 34­35].
This type of affiliation clearly sets Belarusians apart from the 
West and brings them close together with their eastern neighbour. 
It also creates a much less dynamic identity than in the case of the 
Latin denominations. At the same time, it is so peculiar that president 
Lukaskenka can declare himself as an ‘Orthodox atheist’ (it would be 
quite difficult indeed to find a Western analogy). Such an approach is 
rooted in Russian culture, which throughout its history defined itself 
in terms of clear distance from the West, a pattern unknown in West­
ern Europe. Orthodoxy was brought to Belarus from Russia, along 
with the Russian institutional and cultural background. It does not 
use the Belarusian language in its liturgy, which contributes to the 
spread of Russian. Also, Belarusian Orthodox Church is entirely de­
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pendent on the Moscow Patriarchate: until recently it was headed by 
Metropolitan Filaret, a Moscow­born Russian, and since 2013 it has 
been led by Metropolitan Pavel, a Russian born in Karaganda and a 
former Metropolitan of Ryazan. However, accepting Orthodoxy with 
its Russian language liturgy did not amount to Russification in the na­
tional sense, but rather involved a cultural and linguistic assimilation 
which regionalised Belarusians within the pan­Russian community. 
Thus, the Orthodox Church does not function as a nation­maker, 
but rather as a factor of Russian cultural (and civilisational) orienta­
tion. On the other hand, the Catholic Church supports the national 
emancipation of Belarusians by including their language in liturgy, 
even though most parts of religious services are still held in Polish. 
It has greater nation­making potential than its Orthodox counterpart, 
but at the same time one can observe a certain duality of its national 
character, oriented as it is both towards Polishness and Belarusian­
ness. This situation is not conducive to forming a uniform modern 
pattern of Belarusian identity. 
The Catholic Church certainly fosters a pro­European orientation 
among Belarusians and it cannot remain unnoticed that a consider­
able proportion of elites of Belarusian national movement, now form­
ing the political opposition, are Catholic. This obvious overrepresen­
tation of Catholics resembles the situation in the early 20th century 
period of the ‘national revival’. After independence, between 1991 
and 1994, the most prominent Belarusian politicians were of Catholic 
background, which sometimes provoked negative comments in a pre­
dominantly Orthodox society (Vyacheslav Kebich, the Prime Minis­
ter; Stanislav Shushkevich and Myechyslav Hryb, Chairmen of Par­
liament, and thus heads of the state; Zianon Pazniak, the founder of 
Belarusian National Front, an anti­communist national party, a leader 
of the national movement, a member of parliament and a presiden­
tial candidate in 1994). In 1994, Belarusians elected Lukashenka as 
president: he was ‘one of their own’, a typical Russian­speaking So­
viet man and a former sovkhoz director on the Russian border. Since 
attitudes promoted by the Catholic community, mainly by its more 
active part, are conducive to the western orientation, they are not fa­
voured by the Orthodox Church. In this way, whether intentionally or 
not, to a certain extent both Churches play a political role, promoting 
Belarusian identification with either the East or the West. 
43Серія «Культурологія». Випуск 15. Частина 2.
Compared to Catholics, the Belarusian Orthodox community is 
more conservative, less active and characterised by a higher level of 
social inertia. Such differences in values and attitudes were revealed 
in a representative survey conducted in September 2005 by the Inde­
pendent Institute of Socio­Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS), 
a leading Belarusian independent centre of sociological studies. Oleg 
Manaev, its founder and director, compared the replies of Orthodox 
and Catholic respondents and their choices were as follows:
‘The general situation in Belarus is: improving’6 – Orthodox: 
62.6%, Catholics: 43.8%;
‘How important is it to you personally that Belarus should be a 
democratic state: very important’ – 32.7% and 45.5%, respectively;
‘In a referendum, would you vote for: an economic union with 
Russia’ – 53.5% and 34.1%, respectively; ‘for EU membership’ – 
12,0% and 21.8%, respectively;
‘In 2001, you voted for: Lukashenka’ – 56.3% and 43.6%, respectively;
‘I would be ready to vote for Lukashenka again’ – 47.7% and 
35.6%, respectively
‘I am interested in / I talk about political questions relating to Be­
larus’ – 65.8% and 80.1%, respectively
The Orthodox less frequently stated that Belarus was facing eco­
nomic (23.9% and 36.3%, respectively) and political crisis (25.9 and 
40.5%, respectively), were less inclined to welcome the country’s ac­
cession to NATO and showed less support for a presidential candidate 
who would introduce reforms (47.2% and 64.3%, respectively) [17, 
p. 45­46]. Noting that ‘Catholics are more critical of the situation in 
Belarus’, Manaev also adds: ‘the country is dominated by Orthodoxy, 
a value system closely corresponding to that of authoritarian power’ 
[17, p. 47]. The distance between the attitudes of the two communities 
would certainly be even greater if Catholics had not lost their elites as a 
result of the Bolshevik revolution, repressions in the newly established 
Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic, repressions of the 1939­1941 pe­
riod and the post­war exodus to Poland. In spite of all their differences, 
relations between members of both communities are mostly proper. 
However, in exclusively Orthodox areas Catholicism may be per­
ceived as alien, in accordance with the stereotype that a (Belo)Russian 
6 Generally, only the first (and, in my opinion, the most significant) of 
the available options is included in the text.
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is Orthodox by definition, a mirror image of a ‘Catholic Pole’ tradition 
in Poland. The sovkhoz and kolkhoz Catholic population is sometimes 
just as Sovietised as the Orthodox one. Animosities between the two 
communities are mainly stirred by the authorities. It would seem that 
one of the factors contributing to their peaceful coexistence involves a 
generally low level of national awareness among Belarusians, whereby 
concerns of everyday existence prevail over ideological ones. Without 
nationalist movements and with a low level of emotional engagement 
in politics, the question of a civilisational orientation does not excite 
social interest; in fact, among rural population it is often hardly no­
ticed at all. In comparison not only with Polish, but also with Russian 
reality, where some nationalist groups often invoke Orthodoxy as an 
important element of Russian national culture, it could be said that Or­
thodoxy is a relatively ‘lukewarm’ component of Belarusian identity 
and does not function as a strong factor of social integration. 
Olga Breskaya, a Belarusian academic, refers to the Ingelhart­Wel­
zel cultural map of the world based on the analysis of ‘survival versus 
self­expression values’ and ‘traditional versus secular­rational values’, 
to observe that ‘Belarus has a high score in secular­rational values and 
a low score in self­expression values. (…) Changes in religious life 
in Belarus are characterised by (…) a paradox: on the one hand, we 
can observe a growth in factors indicating rising religiousness on the 
individual, institutional, social and state level; on the other hand, Be­
larusian awareness is highly secularised, which implies the opposite 
tendency’ [14, p. 242­243]. Poland has also experienced processes of 
secularisation, especially in large cities, as well as among the younger 
generation and social elites. However, despite some analogies, the 
place and functions of religion in the two societies are clearly differ­
ent, which stems mainly from the historical context. 
Translated from Polish by Piotr Styk
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